Abstract: Advanced human-system interface (HSI) technology is being integrated into existing nuclear plants as part of plant modificatim and upgrades. The result of this trend is that hybrid HSIs are created, i.e., HSIs containing a mixture of conventional (analog) and advanced (digital) technology. The purpose of the present research is to d e h e the potential effects of hybrid HSIs on personnel performance and plant safety and to develop human factors guidance for safety reviews of them where necessary. In support of this objective, human factors issues associated with hybrid HSIs were identified. The issues were evaluated for their potential s i g " to plant safety, i.e., their human performance concerns have the potential to compromise plant safety. The issues were then prioritized and a subset was selected for design review guidance development.
I. INTRODUCTION
As part of modifications to control systems and human-system interfaces (HSI) in existing nuclear power plants (NPPs), advanced technologies that are predominantly based on digital technologies are being introduced. The result of this evolution is that hybrid HSIs are created; i.e., HSIs containing a mixture of analog and digital technology. While the introduction of advanced HSI technology is generally considered to enhance system performance, there is also the potential to negatively impact human performance, spawn new types of human errors, and reduce human reliability. Two examples of how hybrid HSIs could potentially impact safety follow [I]. In the first example, a keyboard entty coupled with a mispositioned system panel switch led to the lockup of a microprocessor-based overhead, annunciator 
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Ofice of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 system that went undetected for over one hour. A subsequent investigation revealed that the annunciator system could be locked up ifan operator initiated a specific input twice while the system was connected to the wrong computer port. In another event, an operator assumed manual control of a fill-range digital feedwater control system during power ascension, and tried to "bump" open the feedwater valve using a series of short intermittent key presses. However, the operator was unaware that each press corresponded to only about 0.1 % demand, and the series of key presses translated into negligible changes in valve position demand. As a result, the plant tripped on low steam generator level. A contributing factor was that the feedback provided by the new digital controller to the incremental manual manipulations was not as clear as the floating needle indication of the former analog system. Additional examples may be found in [2,3]. Thus, it is important to consider the potential effects of these technologies on personnel. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is sponsoring research at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to better define the effects of hybrid HSIs on personnel performance and plant safety and to develop human factors engineering (HFE) guidance to support safety reviews. Should a review of plant modifications involving a safety significant aspect of hybrid HSIs be necessary, such guidance will be needed to provide the NRC staffwith the technical basis to help ensure that the modifications do not compromise safety
The first task was to identify human Performance topics and issues related to hybrid HSIs based upon literature review, interviews, and site visits Current and future HSI technology changes were categorized and the potential effects of the changes on personnel performance were examined. Hybrid HSI effects stem from both the new technology itself and its interaction with the analog technology. The effects can be related to: (1) personnel role -a change in functions and responsibilities of plant personnel such as may be caused by a change in plant automation;
(2) prinru?y tusks -a change in the way that personnel perform their primaiy tasks which are tasks directly involved with operating the plant, such as process monitoring, situation assessment, response planning, and response execution and control; (3) secondary tusks -a change in the tasks the operator must perform when interacting with the HSI, such as navigating through displays, searching for data, choosing between multiple ways of accomplishing the same task, and deciding how to configure the interface, but are not directly related to operating the plant; (4) cognitivefucfors -a change in the cognitive factors supporting personnel task performance, such as situation awareness and workload, and ( 5 ) personnel factors -a change in the required qualifications or training of plant personnel.
The Several general human peifoimance issues were identified There is an overall trend away from spatially dedicated HSIs, which support parallel processing of information, toward virtual work spaces which introduce new demands for serial access to information and controls. This can result in greater cognitive workload and more time spent peiforming secondaiy tasks. Computer-based systems can also add to plant complexity and personnel needs for interacting with these complex systems are often inadequately addressed. For example, the sys always consider the need for information in the CO operator's current tasks, goals, and objectives or t feedback to the operator from computer systems acti a good mental model or understanding of how CO systems work is essential to proper monitoring, supervision, and maintenance of plant systems Failure to account for the operator's need to supervise plant systems may result In poor situation awareness and a sense of being out-of-the-loop In addition, personnel concerns, such as training and acceptance, are significant considerations in the introduction of new technology (see [3] for a discussion of the human peifoimance issues).
While numerous specific human performance conceins have been identified, it does not necessarily follow that they are all safety significant. The following is a discussion of the safety evaluation conducted for the human performance topics identified above (see [4] for more detail).
I1 METHODOLOGY
The safety evaluation methodology consisted of the following steps: (1) Preliminary Screening, (2) Safety Significance Analysis, (3) Initial Prioritization, (4) Peer Review, and ( Classification and Prioritization. In the first step, topics were screened out if they were already being addressed by the NRC in other projects. The second step was the safety significance analysis. The analysis was based on an adap developed by EPRI in Guideline on Licens [SI, which was endorsed by the NRC in Generic Letter 95-02 [6] The general rationale and implementati of the method is discussed below 1.
2.
3. 4. Commercial nuclear power plant licensees are permitted to make plant modifications without prior NRC review if the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 [7] for the determination of an unreviewed safety question (USQ) are satisfied. These provisions nsee can (a) make changes in the facility as desciibed in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), (b) make changes in the procedures as described in the SAR, and (6) conduct tests or experiments not described in the S A R without NRC review and approval prior to implementation, provided that the proposed change, test, or experiment does not involve a change in the Technical Specifications or involve a USQ. A proposed modification is considered to involve a USQ under the following conditions [see 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2)]. (1) if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or equipment important to safety previously evaluat analysis report may be increased; (2) if a PO accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; and (3) if the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced The determination of whether or not a USQ may exist IS made by the licensee based on a safety evaluation of the proposed change The purpose of a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation is not to determine whether or not a proposed change is sde. Further, a determination that a proposed change involves a USQ does not necessarily mean that the change is unsafe. It means that further NRC review is necessary prior to implementation of the change.
The EPFU guidance focusses on digital upgrade issues and was developed to assist licensees m implementing and licensing digital upgrades using the 10 CFR 50 59 evaluation criteria. The evaluation process may be peifoimed qualitative begins with Seven primaiy questions and a set questions to help focus the analysis on important considerations An answer of "yes" to any of the seven primary questions indicates that a USQ exists The primary questions are May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR)?
May the proposed activity increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in the SAR?
May the proposed activity increase the probability of occunence of a makction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the S A R ?
May the proposed activity increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the SAR?
May the proposed activlty create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the S " 7
May the proposed activity create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety when the
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malfunction is of a different type than any evaluated previously in the SAR?
7. Does the proposed activity reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification?
The hybrid HSI human performance topics were considered to be within the context of potential plant modifications that need to be reviewed with respect to their potential as USQs. Thus, the WRI guidance was used as a general model for the development of a safety significance analysis methodology for evaluating the hybrid HSI topics. However, it is important to consider two essential differences between the characterizations of the HSI topics and descriptions of actual plant modifications. First, the information describing the topics is less detailed than a description of an actual plant modification. Hybrid HSI topics are generic in the sense that they are relevant to broad classes of upgrades and the fill range of operating NPPs. The description for an actual plant modification would contain detailed information regarding characteristics of the specific upgrade. Second, plant-specific information, such as S A R analyses, plant descriptions, and upgrade implementation plans would be available for an actual upgrade, but is not available for generic Characterizations of hybrid HSb.
With these differences in mind, the analysis process was modified somewhat to better reflect its use as a research tool. Each hybrid topic was described in terms related to a potential modification that could be made to existing NPPs. The example modifications were then evaluated using the EPRI guidance. The wording of the questions was modified slightly. The phrase "proposed activity" was replaced with the phrase "proposed modification." Because the evaluation was based on a characterization of an upgrade, rather than an actual upgrade, evaluations of "likely" or "not likely" were applied to the primary questions rather than the more definitive responses of "yes" or "no," which would be used in the evaluation of an actual plant modification. Associated with the seven primary questions were supplemental questions, which addressed specific characteristics of digital systems. A subset of the supplemental questions that pertained to personnel performance was considered in the evaluation. These supplemental considerations generally addressed (1) failure modes that are caused or aggravated by personnel actions, and (2) failure modes and equipment characteristics that have negative effects on personnel An additional modification related to the findings. In the evaluation of actual plant m a c a t i o n s , a "yes'' response to any of the primary questions results in the identification of a USQ. In our analysis methodology, a "likely" response to any of the primary questions resulted in an identification of the topic as "potentially safety si@cant." Similar to a USQ, the identification of a topic as a potentially safety significant issue does not mean that the types of plant modifications represented by the topic are necessarily &e.
It means that its human performance concerns have the potential to compromise plant safety. Therefore, should a review be necessary of plant modifications involving safety s i g " t topics, guidance will be needed by NRC staff with the performance.
technical basis to help ensure that the modifications do not compromise safety. Achamcterization of each topic was developed to serve as a basis for topic evaluations. Some topics were characterized as typical near-term modifications. These were modifications that could plausibly be performed today at an existing plant, such as the installation of a computer-based procedure system. Other topics were concerned with the process by which designs are developed and implemented. These were described in processrelated terms. Each characterization also included a description of the human performance concerns that may be associated with the topic.
Using these characterizations, each topic was evaluated using the seven primary questions and the subset of the supplemental considerations from the EPRI guidance. Then an overall assessment of whether a topic was "potentially safety significant" was made based on the seven primary evaluation questions. The evaluations were performed by four BNL personnel with expertise in the areas of human factors, HSI design, NPP operations, probabilistic risk assessment, and SAR analysis.
In the next step, the topics that were identified as potentially safety significant issues were prioritized to support the effective use of research resources in the development of HFE guidance. The prioritization was based on a subjective analysis of (1) the degree to which the topic addressed the performance of personnel directly involved in the operation of the plant versus personnel involved in supporting roles, and (2) the degree to which the topic addressed HSI components that are primary sources of information and control capabilities for operators.
The final step was to obtain an independent review of the topic evaluation and prioritization. Five external reviewers were selected with special expertise in digital I&C, risk analysis, human factors, human reliability analysis, NPP operations, and operator training. The reviewers were knowledgeable in the area of HSI upgrades and effects on personnel performance and plant safety.
They were asked to indicate whether they agreed with the overall BNL assessment of the potential safety significance of each topic and whether they agreed with the prioritization of the topics. Followingthe peer review, a final prioritization of the topics was developed based on input from the independent review.
FINDINGS
All of the topics were found likely to be potentially safety sigruficant. The topics of Alarm System Design and Management and Staffing and Crew Coordination were eliminated during the preliminary screening step because they are already being addressed by the NRC in other projects. The topics generally had broad impact on the types of human actions that are important to the role of personnel in the plant, such as monitoring and detection, situation assessment, response planning, and response execution. Thus, the safety si&icance analysis established a link to plant safety.
Once identified as potentially safety significant issues, the topics were then evaluated to determine their relative priority. The topics were organized into three broad categories: High, Medium, andLow. In establishing the High category it was recognized that plant operators are a last line of defense in the case of an emergency. Thus, the High category included those topics that were considered to have a high PO a1 effect on the ability of operators to respond in the case of an emergency, such as an accident or a major transient that could become an accident. This category includes the HSI components that are primary sources of mformation and control capability and upon which operators rely to support their primary functions of situation assessment, response planning, and response execution. The high category included: Design Analyses and Evaluation, Upgrade Implementation, Computer-Based Procedures, Information Design and Organization, S Automation. The medium ca Control of Digital Systems and The low category included: Characteristics.
As indicated above, the results were evaluated by peer reviewers. Based on the results of the review a reprioritization was performed. The reprioritization led to the inclusion of Maintenance of Digital Systems in the high priority group.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are important human performance topics associated with hybrid HSIs that relate to both the technology itself, as well as its design, evaluation, and implementation. Using a safety analysis methodology, it was determined that potentially safety significant. The topics we guidance development is currently underway using the methodology established for NUREG-0700, Revision 1 [SI. This guidance will be included in Revision 2 to the document.
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